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Expectations Formation and Inflation Persistence

1.

Introduction.
Policy credibility is defined as agents' assessment of the likelihood that

announced policies will indeed be carried out. To what can we attribute any lack of full
credibility? First, agents may be uncertain about the true "type" of the policy-maker
(Backus and Driffill (1985a, 1985b». Second, even if agents are certain that the true
intention of the policymaker is to carry out the announced policy, there might be some
probability that the policymaker is faced with an environment where he/she has no choice
but to abandon the policy (Drazen and Masson (1994), Obstfeld (1997». However,
having a well-defined policymaker and a very low probability of abandoning the policy
may not be sufficient for a quick adjustment to a low inflation target. To illustrate,
consider a currency board.
Currency boards are institutions that replace central banks and ensure that
domestic currency can be purchased on demand at a fixed exchange rate. I The fixed level
of the exchange rate can be altered only by the Parliament and, in addition, domestic
money is fully backed by foreign exchange reserves held by the government. In its
Orthodox form, a currency board has no responsibilities regarding the provision of
liquidity to the banking system, financing the budget deficit or unemployment.
In other words, to reduce uncertainty as to the "type" of the policy-maker, a

currency board aims to remove discretion over monetary policy. To address the second

I See Schwartz (1993) and Williamson (1995) for a discussion on the history and operation of currency
boards.

factor for low credibility, sufficient foreign exchange reserves, political consensus and
international support are secured, and programs for structural reform are drawn to ensure
that the currency board will remain in place for the foreseeable future.
With the two factors for low credibility minimized, will expected inflation fall to
a rate close to the inflation of the reserve currency when the new regime is introduced? In
survey data collected at the introduction of a currency board in Bulgaria, expected
inflation is affected by the new regime but does not decline to low levels irnrnediately.2
Why is that the case? In other words, what factors, other than credibility, influence the
degree to which expectations are affected by the new regime? One potential factor is how
well-versed agents are in the implications of a currency board. The data from Bulgaria
support the hypothesis that "transparency" and credibility of the regime have separate and
significant influences on expected inflation.
More generally, what are the long-run properties and short-term dynamics of
inflation if monetary policy is transparent to only part of the population? Are there
incentives for the central bank to try to influence the distribution of agents? In the
theoretical part of the paper, we address these and related questions.
In spirit, we follow Haltiwanger and Waldman (1989) in assuming that some

agents form more informed (rational) expectations and the rest form less informed

2Studies of exchange-rate-based stabilization have revealed a number of stylized facts: rapid convergence of
inflation from high to moderate levels but, in some cases, slow convergence from moderate to low levels,
and an initial increase in real activity~ See Sargent (1982), Bruno (1993), Calvo and Vegh (1994a, b), Calvo
(1986), Fischer (1986), pazos (1972), Roldos (1995).
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(adaptive) expectations. We analyze the implications of such heterogeneity in a simple
Barro-Gordon (1983) model of monetary policy?
We find that long-run average inflation is lower the higher the proportion of
agents who form nai"ve expectations. Intuitively, adaptive expectations have a
\,

"disciplining" effect on central banks as higher current inflation is built into expectations
of future inflation. We also find that in high inflation periods the central bank will prefer
a higher proportion of agents who form more informed expectations but not so once
inflation is lower. 4
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In sections 2 and 3, we develop a
model with heterogeneous agents in a Barro-Gordon (1983) framework. In sections 4 and
5, we discuss the survey data and present our findings. Section 6 summarizes the results.

2.

A model of monetary policy with heterogeneous agents.
Output Yt (all variables in logarithms) differs from its natural level by an amount

determined by the real wage (wt-Pt):
(1)

y, =

y - (w, - p,) - u,

where ut is an i.i.d. supply shock with mean zero and variance

d.

Inflation 1ft is defined

by:

(2)

7',

= P, - P,-J

3 Sethi and Franke (1995) and Crettez and Michel (1992) develop models which endogenize the decision of
agents to form rational versus adaptive expectations. Because forming rational expectations is costly and
agents face different costs, the two groups emerge naturally. Conditional on lagged inflation dynamics, the
proportion of naive agents changes over time. However, given variability in inflation, it is shown that both
types of expectation formation generally persist over time.
4Cukierman an Meltzer (1986) discuss a model, which accounts for central bank secrecy, in which the
central bank may prefer that the private sector is uncertain of currenct objectives of monetary policy.
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Agents are heterogeneous in' the way they fonn inflationary expectations. A
proportion Oof all agents fonn adaptive expectations:
(3)

which yields:

(4)
The remaining (1-8) agents form rational expectations. Denote their expectations
of the price level by

E'~IP, .

Before the shock u, has been observed, the nominal wage is set at the average
expected price:
(5)

Define the monetary authorities' loss function L, as:
(6)

where

y,

is the level of output targeted by the policymaker. By substituting (5) into (1)

and (1) into (6), we write the loss function as:
(7)

= [1Zi - (1- O)Et-l 1Zi - 01Zi-J - kt -Utf + a 1Zi2

Lt

where £'_1'"
k, = )i, -

Yt

= E'~IP,
>

- Pt-l is expected inflation by agents with rational expectations and

°

is the difference between the target and the natural level of output.

After observing the nominal wage and the shock u,' the government chooses
inflation ", to minimize:
co

(8)

min 11'/

Lli E, Lt +;
;=0

where ,Be [0,1]. Substitute from (7) into (8) and assume kt+i=k, all i. The objective can
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then be written:
(8' )

min"., V,

= [1r, - (1 -

O)E,_t1r, - 01r,_1 - k - uJ + a1rr +

Provided that some agents fonu adaptive expectations (() > 0) inflation in period t
is built into expectations of inflation for period 1+1 and beyond. Monetary authorities
choose inflation to balance their current and future inflation and output objectives.
The first order condition with respect to

1ft

and using certainty equivalence yields:

(9)

Then taking expectations of both sides of (9) as of time t-1 and collecting tenus
yields the following difference equation:

a + () + p(}2
(10)

E t-11Cr+l -

p(}2

1
E t-1 1Cr + P(} 1Cr-l

k

=-(l-P(}) p(}2

As shown in the Appendix, the solution for (10) can be written:
(11)

where A) (0 < A) < 1) is the smaller root of the characteristic equation and
(12)

1i =(1- P(J)~
a

In the absence of future shocks, inflation is expected to gradually approach a longrun equilibrium level of

7i. Note that 7i will be lower the higher the proportion

(fJ) of

naive agents. The effect is magnified if the central bank places more weight on the
expected value of its future losses as indicated by greater values for

p.

Intuitively, naive

agents have a "disciplining" effect on the central bank in tenus of raising inflation.
Higher current inflation is built into the expectations of naYve agents and, thus, implies

5

greater future expected losses to the central bank. 5 Also, from (12), long-run inflation
decreases in the resolve of the monetary authorities to fight inflation (a) and increases in
the magnitude of their output objectives (k).

2.1

Inflation Dynamics
The Al parameter is shown in the Appendix to be:

(13)

The anticipated speed of adjustment toward the long run inflation rate is given by (1- AI)
or, put differently, the degree of persistence in inflation is given by AI. We are interested
in the effect of the resolve of the central bank to fight inflation (a), the discount factor
(/1), and the proportion of naIve agents (8) on this inflation persistence.
First, note that Al is a decreasing function of

Cl.

The greater the relative weight

that the central bank puts on inflation in its objective function, the more rapidly it will try
to bring down inflation to the long-run level, as well as having a lower long-run inflation
target.
A similar intuition applies to the fact that Al is a decreasing function

of~.

If the

monetary authority puts relatively more weight on future losses, it wants to get high
inflation out of the system more quickly.
Somewhat surprisingly there is an ambiguity in the effect of 8 on AI. Intuitively
we expected that a greater proportion of naIve agents who base their inflation

SNote that without naive agents (8=0) or with a myopic policymaker (~=O), long run inflation is /cia, the
solution to a one-period Barro-Gordon problem.
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Figure 1.1 Inflation persistence,
Low Beta

Figure 1.2 Inflation persistence,
High Beta
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expectations on past inflation would increase the persistence of inflation. This is the case
if ~ is not too high. However, when

~

is high, A) attains an interior maximum as 8 varies

from 0 to 1. These cases are depicted in Figures 1.1 and 1.2. In both figures, a=0.1 and
k=1. In Figure 1.1, {)=0.5 and in Figure 1.2, fJ=O.95. With higher 13, the costs in future

periods from not reducing inflation now may outweigh the persistence effect of higher 8.
Next we consider how responsive the monetary authority is to a supply shock. As
shown in the Appendix, with u, ~ 0, current inflation is:
(14)

The rather complicated coefficient on u, is unambiguously positive, so that a negative
shock to output will call for an increase in inflation. How large that response will be
depends on the parameters a,

13, and

B. In terms of the effect of more naIve agents on the

responsiveness of inflation to a supply shock, we can distinguish two opposing effects.
First, a higher value of B means that the central bank can more effectively offset the
output effect of a supply shock. Second, with more naIve agents any shock-induced

7

deviation from steady state inflation may persist longer, so that the central bank's
response to shocks in terms of inflation will be smaller because of the future cost of
current inflation. That second effect is stronger when the authorities put more weight on
future periods, i.e., have a higher

2.3.

p.

Optimal proportion ofagents with adaptive expectations.
In this section we ask whether the central bank has any preference regarding the

distribution of agents in the two groups -- with rational and with adaptive expectations. In
particular, the bank may choose to adopt a monetary regime characterized, among other
features, by more or less transparency. Formally, we write the value function (8) as (see
Appendix):

v, = [1rr - (AI - AlB + B)1rt-J (8")

ky + a1r; +

(1- AIX1- B)1rr -

+ ~Pj{[ B(A -1)A/- I(1rr -7f)~

ky + a[A/1r + (1- A/)7f f}
r

and we are interested in the value of e that minimizes (8") given 1tt-l.
Figures 2.1, 2.2 and 2.3 show three examples in which the value function (8") is
calculated for e in the interval between 0 and 1. In all examples, a = 0.2 and k = 1 so that
long term-inflation in the absence of naive agents (with

e = 0) would be 5, and p = 0.9.

We calculated the value function with three different values for
high, moderate and low inflation. In Figure 2.1,
inflation with no naive agents), in Figure 2.2,

1tt-l=

1tt-1

1tt-1

chosen to proxy for

30 (high compared to equilibrium

= 15 ("moderate" but still higher than

equilibrium inflation with no naive agents), and in Figure 2.3,

1tt-1

=5

(equal to

equilibrium inflation with no naive agents).
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Figure 2.1 Value
Function, high inflation
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There are two considerations here. More agents with adaptive expectations means
a lower long run inflation. At the same time more agents with adaptive expectations also
generally have the effect of slowing down the speed with which the inflation target is
approached. Thus, when inflation is very high, the central bank prefers more informed
agents since this will reduce inflation more quickly. However, at lower initial inflation
rates, long-run inflation becomes relatively more important and the central bank will
prefer fewer informed agents.
One interesting implication is that reducing moderate inflation will occur at a
slower rate compared to reducing high inflation to the extent that the central bank can
manage to be more transparent and have more rational agents when initial inflation is
high.

3.

Empirical hypotheses
In this section, we derive hypotheses regarding differences in expected inflation

between the two types of agents if a new monetary rule consistent with lower long-run
inflation is introduced. In particular, let the new monetary rule be summarized by a
greater value for a, adopted at time T:

9

if t<T
ift ~T

(15)

where a*>a. As a result, steady-state inflation from equation (12) will be lower under
the new regime: 1r(a *) - i(a) < 0
Assume that prior period inflation is at the old steady state level,

tr T _ J

=

i(a) .

Hence, from (11),just before the new policy is implemented expected inflation by agents
with rational expectations is a weighted average of the old and the new levels of long-run
inflation:
(16)
Subtract 1tT-l from both sides of (16):
(17)

This establishes Hypothesis 1. Immediately after the new lower inflation policy is
announced, agents with rational expectations hold expectations of lower inflation than
agents with adaptive expectations.
Next subtract 7f(a *) from both sides of (16):
(18)
This establishes Hypothesis 2. Immediately after the new lower inflation policy is
announced, agents with rational expectations expect inflation to be above the new target
inflation rate.
Finally if monetary policy is unchanged and inflation is approximately at its old
long-run level, it is rational to expect the current rate of inflation
Hypothesis 3.

1tT-I.

Thus, we have

If there is no change in regime, then agents with rational and adaptive

expectations will expect the same rate of inflation.
10

The introduction of a new monetary rule consistent with lower inflation will thus
drive a wedge between the expectations of those who are informed and those who are
naive about its implications. The new currency board in Bulgaria in July 1997 is one
instance in which people were asked about their inflation expectations after the currency
board was announced and before it went into effect.

4.

Description of the survey.
A national survey was conducted in Bulgaria during the last two weeks of June

1997 immediately before the introduction of a currency board on July 1st. By mid June,
the fixed level of the exchange rate and the members of the currency board were
announced. The survey (with 1022 respondents) is considered representative for the
country. It was conducted as part of a larger survey on political attitudes and current
economic conditions. We used two of the questions from the survey. In the first, each
respondent was asked about herlhis expectation of the average monthly inflation over the
following year if a currency board is introduced and, in the second, about herlhis
expectation of the average monthly inflation over the following year if a currency board
were not introduced. Monthly rather than annual rates of inflation were chosen because at
that time, after a period of high and unstable inflation, price movements were generally
discussed and quoted in the media in terms of monthly rather than yearly changes.
The study is unique in the sense that it captures a very specific moment. First, the
introduction of a currency board is an event with very low frequency. Second, the survey
was carried out immediately before the introduction of the currency board but after the .
legislation and all parameters of the board were publicly announced. In that sense, there
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was no uncertainty about the level at which the nominal exchange rate was to be fixed or
about the members of the board.
Respondents also indicated their age, education level, gender, and political
attitudes. Income data were provided by too few respondents to be usable in the
estimations.

4.1.

A briefbackground on the economic conditions in Bulgaria.
The currency board was introduced in Bulgaria on July 1, 1997 after the idea was

first made public in late 1996. Following a period of financial stability, the domestic
currency depreciated by 570 percent during 1996 along with the failure of several major
banks representing some 20 percent of the total assets in the banking system. The
beginning of 1997 was characterized by further devaluation and price increases resulting
in close to 40 percent average monthly inflation for the year before the currency board
was introduced.

6

The lev was fixed at approximately its then current market price of 1 lev = 1,000
German marks. There was substantial debate about the choice of the German mark over
the US dollar as the currency to which the lev was to be pegged. Germany is a traditional
major trading partner of Bulgaria and most of the regional trade is in marks. However,
energy sources, traded in US dollars, account for some 30 percent of the imports to the
country. Presumably for reasons of transparency, a peg to a trade-weighted basket of
currencies was not adopted. The level of the peg was considered inappropriate by some
institutions who preferred that the lev should be devalued further to provide a "cushion"
against possible inflation persistence after July 1. At the introduction of the board, the

6See Valev (1998).
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problems in the banking system, the bulk of which is still state-owned, were partially
resolved and a commitment was made to speed the privatization process in the real and
financial sectors.
In the last few months before July 1st, a considerable debate about what is a currency

board and whether it is appropriate in Bulgaria occupied the media. The opinions
expressed were often conflicting but, in general, the amount of information appeared
sufficient for a lay person to understand what a currency board implies at least for the
near future.

5.

Results.
At the introduction of a low-inflation regime, different expected inflation across

agents can be explained, among other factors, by different perceptions of the true
intentions of the policy-maker as well as by agents' understanding of the regime's
operation and implications. We use political affiliation to distinguish agents by their
perceptions of the policymaker, and we use level of education to distinguish respondents
in terms of their information about the currency board. 7 Hence, the central hypotheses we
test are that political supporters of the government and more educated agents will expect
lower inflation compared to the rest of the population. given that a currency board is
introduced. Such differences are not expected to arise if a currency board is not
introduced.
Table 1 shows mean and median expected inflation with and without a currency
board for the overall sample and for subsamples defined by education, political

More educated agents have greater contact with the media where discussions of the policy shift take place.
Another potential reason is that more educated agents occupy positions which require them to fonn moreinfonned expectations and offer them better resources to do so.

7
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affiliation, gender and age. Average expected monthly inflation with a currency board is
25, percent, and without a currency board, 50 percent. Note however that median expected
inflation is 10 percent if a currency board is introduced and 25 percent if it is not. Because
of the positive skewness of the answers, the median may be a better measure of central
tendency. Clearly, the introduction of a currency board is consistent with lower expected
inflation but does not by itself lower expectations to desired levels (the inflation of the
German mark).
Table 1 also reports the mean and the median of expected inflation·in subsamples.
Again, the mean may not be an appropriate measure for differences in expected inflation
because of different skewness across subsamples. Less obviously, differences in medians
across subsamples may not serve that purpose well either. The reason is that most
answers are clustered around certain numbers with fairly large jumps between different
answers. Hence the median values of two subsamples could differ greatly while the
difference results from just a few observations. Similarly, two subsample medians could
be the same despite significant differences in the distribution of answers.
To resolve the problem, we take the following path. First, we divide the overall
samples (with and without a currency board) into high and low expected inflation groups
relative to the respective median. s Second, we test if there is a significant difference in the
proportion of political supporters or more educated agents across the two groups. Note
that this approach also conforms better with the theory where we discuss agents'
heterogeneity in terms of two groups of expectation formation. The results are reported in

Note that for the overall sample, for both inflation with and without a currency board, the median expected
inflation separates the sample at points which is a natural cut in the data.

8
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Table 2.1 for expected inflation with currency board, in Table 2.2 for expected inflation
without a currency board.
In Table 2.1 we find that more educated agents and political supporters of the

government represent a significantly greater proportion in the group of agents with lower
inflationary expectations than in the group with higher inflationary expectations given
that a currency board is introduced. Gender and age do not appear to be associated with
high or low expected inflation. In Table 2.2, if a currency board is not introduced, none of
the variables have significantly different representations in the two groups. The lack of
effect of political affiliation on expected inflation if a currency board is not introduced
coupled with the significant effect with a currency board suggests that the credibility of
the government to reduce inflation is related to a specific policy, in this case the
introduction of a currency board.
Approximately 30 percent of the respondents did not provide a forecast. With few
exceptions, they provided either both forecasts, with and without a currency board, or
none at all. It is likely that the selection process is not random and that respondents selfselected on the basis of observable factors. Hence, estimation of the effect of political
affiliation and education may produce biased results.
We employ Heckman's (1979) procedure to correct for self-selection bias. It
involves the maximum likelihood estimation of participation equation which explains the
decision to provide a forecast and a regression equation relating expected inflation to
education and political affiliation. The procedure produces consistent and asymptotically
efficient estimates by taking into account the correlation of the error terms in the two
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equations. 9 The results are reported in Table 3. The dependent variable is 1 if expected
inflation is above the median and 0 otherwise. IO The reported estimates of A in Table 3
indicate the degree of selection bias. There is evidence of significant selection bias in the
case of expected inflation with a currency board but not so without a currency board. 11
The significant negative coefficients on both education and political affiliation
given that a currency board is introduced indicate that they do have separate and distinct
influences on expected inflation.

6.

Conclusion.
In this paper, in the spirit of Haltiwanger and Waldman (1989), we trace the

implications of heterogeneity among agents in terms of expectation formation. In
particular, we solve a simple Barro-Gordon (1983) model where some agents form more
informed (rational) expectations and others form less informed (adaptive) expectations
We find that steady state inflation decreases in the proportion of naIve agents.
Intuitively, adaptive expectations have a "disciplining" effect on central banks in view of
the fact that higher current inflation is built into expectations of future inflation. We also
analyze the incentives of the monetary authorities to publicly communicate and discuss
policy objectives and methods and, thus, potentially affect the distribution of agents into
the two groups. We find that, in high inflation periods, the central bank will prefer a
higher proportion of agents who form more informed expectations but not so in moderate
and low inflation periods.
For information on the procedure see Heckman (1979), Greene (1991), and Stata Corporation (1997).
Qualitatively, the same results were obtained using levels of expected inflation.
II We estimated specifications including age and gender in the regression equation and did not find
evidence of significant relationships between these variables and expected inflation. On average women
9

10
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We use data from a survey conducted in Bulgaria immediately before the
introduction of a currency board in that country to examine influences on expected
inflation and to test some of the predictions of the model. Agents do hold different
expectations and these differences can be partially attributed to factors that proxy for the
degree to which agents are informed of the workings of monetary policy. Party affiliation
can be viewed as a proxy for a belief in the credibility of the new monetary regime
(currency board), and we use education to proxy for the exposure agents have to
discussion about the implications of the new regime. We·find that supporters of the party
in power and more educated agents do expect significantly lower inflation than those not
supporting the party in power and those with less education.

reported lower expected inflation than men but this did not show up after correcting for selection bias in a
multiple regression specification.
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Table 1
Summary statistics of expected inflation.
Survey results. June 1997, Bulgaria
Mean

Median

Whole Sample

Inflation with currency board
Inflation without currency board

24.96
50.36

10
25

Coeff. of
Variation
(a)
1.75
1.46

Observations

More education

Inflation with currency board
Inflation without currency board

22.4
51.8

10
25

1.77
1.47

460
475

Less education

Inflation with currency board
Inflation without currency board

29.9
47.2

15
25

1.57
1.38

231
226

Political
supporters

Inflation with currency board
Inflation without currency board

21.6
51.6

10
20

1.72
1.46

339
339

Political
opponents

Inflation with currency board
Inflation without currency board

28.1
49.1

15
30

1.66
1.42

352
362

Female

Inflation with currency board
Inflation without currency board

21.07
47.64

10
25

1.09
1.42

341
342

Male

Inflation with currency board
Inflation without currency board

28.74
53.25

10
20

1.96
1.45

347
356

Older

Inflation with currency board
Inflation without currency board

23.2
44.7

10
20

1.16
1.30

256
260

Younger

Inflation with currency board
Inflation without currency board

26.0
53.7

10
30

1.90
1.49

435
441

691
701

Note: Each respondent was asked to proVIde a forecast of the average monthly mflauon rate over the follOWing year
conditional on introducing or not introducing a currency board. Education: more educated if respondent has high school or higher
education. Political affiliation: supporter if today would vote for the party currently in office. Age: older if respondent is more than SO
years old.
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Table 2.1
Agents are divided into two groups -- with high and with low inflation expectations
relative to the median given that a currency board is introduced. The table gives the
proportion of political supporters, educated, female and older agents in the two groups.
Survey data, Bulgaria. June, 1997.

Proportion of more educated
respondents
Proportion of supporters of
the government
Proportion of female
respondents
Proportion of older
respondents

Agents with lower than the
median expected inflation

Agents with higher than the
median expected inflation

Difference

(1)

(1) - (2)

.71

(2)
.62

.55

.42

.13**

.49

.49

.00

.37

.37

.00

..

.09**

. .

Note: EducatIon: more educated If respondent has high school or higher educatIon. PohtIcai affihatIon: supporter If today would vote
for the party currently in office. Age: older if respondent is more than 50 years old. **( *) indicates significance at the 1(5) percent
level.

Table 2.2
Agents are divided into two groups -- with high and with low inflation expectations
relative to the median given that a currency board is not introduced. The table gives the
proportion of political supporters, educated, female and older agents in the two groups.
Survey data, Bulgaria. June, 1997.

Pr.oportion of more educated
ae:ents
Proportion of supporters of
the government
Proportion of female
respondents
Proportion of older
respondents

Agents with higher than the
median expected inflation

Agents with lower than the
median expected inflation

Difference

(1)

(2)
.68

(1) - (2)

.67
.51

.46

.05

.48

.49

-.01

.39

.35

.04

..

-.01

..

Note: EducatIon: more educated If respondent has high school or higher educatIon. PohtIcai affihatIon: supporter If today would vote
for the party currently in office. Age: older if respondent is more than 50 years old. **( *) indicates significance at the 1(5) percent
level.
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Table 3
The effect of political affiliation and education on expected inflation.
Heckman's procedure. Survey data. June 1997, Bulgaria

Education
Political affiliation
Constant

A

Education
Political affiliation
Gender
Age
Constant

Model Chi2(7)
Number of observations

Expected inflation with currency
board

Expected inflation without
currency board

Dependent variable: 1 if expected
inflation is greater than the
median
-0.11 **
(0.04)
-0.12**
(0.04)
0.72
(0.08)
-0.21*
(0.11)

Dependent variable: I if expected
inflation is greater than the
median
-0.01
(0.04)
-0.06
(0.04)
0.59
(0.09)
-0.14
(0.12)

Dependent variable: 1 if
respondent provided an answer, 0
otherwise

Dependent variable: 1 if
respondent provided an answer, 0
otherwise

0.17*
(0.09)
0.13
(0.08)
-0.15*
(0.08)
-0.29**
(0.09)
0.50
(0.10)

0.31 **
(0.09)
0.06
(0.08)
-0.20**
(0.09)
-0.26**
(0.09)
0.49
(0.10)

31.22
1022

42.41
1022

Note: MLE. Mill's ral10 esUmates used as starting values. Standard errors In parentheses. **( *) indicates slgmficance at the 1(5)
percent level. Education: I if respondent has high school or higher education. Political affiliation: I if today would vote for the party
currently in office. Gender: I if female. Age: I if respondent is more than 50 years old.
A significant value for )..=pa. where C1 is the estimated standard error of the residuals of the regression equation and p is the estimated
correlation of the residuals from the participation and the regression equations, indicates evidence of self-selection bias.
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Appendix
In the absence of any shocks, the first-order condition can be written as the following
second-order difference equation:

(AI)

or in lag-operator notation:

where Al and A2 are the roots of the characteristic equation
(A3)

Note that
(A4)
(A.5)

These imply that the smaller root lies between 0 and 1 and the larger root is greater than
1. The smaller root can be written explicitly as

(A6)

One can use (A4) and (A.5) to show that an increase in a or in
AI.

p, with 0 < e < 1, lowers

If one multiplies (A2) through by (1 - A2LrI, the result assuming no bubbles is:
(1-A I L)

7tHI

flO k
= 1z
A -1 flO
z

Then after substituting for (A2-1) from (A5):
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where
(A8)

-

k

1r =(l-PS)-.
a

(A7) also implies that

and that
(A9)

Et 1tt+n = 1r +ii,ft (1r, -1r)

When these substitutions are made in the objective function, we have

V, =[1r, -(ii, -ii,O+O)1Z",_1 -(l-ii,)(l-O)1r, -kr +a*1r,2 +
(A. 10)

+ ~Pi{[B(A-l)ii,i-I(1Z"1 -1f)-kf +a[ii,i1Z", +(l-ii,i)1fr}

From the first order condition, we can then determine how much

1tt

will differ from

Et-l1tt

when Ut is not equal to zero. The result is:
(A12)

2

1- PA

Otr,

at,

=

(1-pA2Xl+a)+apA2 +P02(1_A)2

Hence,

(A13)
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